2011年3月, a massive earthquake and tsunami triggered a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in northern Japan. 三个反应堆发生核熔毁, releasing significant amounts of radiation and stunning a world that had been led to believe that nuclear power was safe .
Following the accident, a task force of senior staff at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 96-page report, 详细介绍了他们对保护美国生物多样性的建议.S. 民众从福岛规模的灾难中逃生. 五年后,美国核管理委员会负责美国核电站的安全.S. nuclear reactors—has either rejected or weakened nearly all of its own staff’s recommendations. Of the changes that have been made—including implementation of the so-called “FLEX” program—it remains unclear whether the money and time invested will yield significant safety improvements.
我们的建议
The Fukushima nuclear disaster wasn’t caused by just an earthquake and a tidal wave—it was also the result of a complacent nuclear power industry and an ineffective regulator. 美国.S. 对这些令人大开眼界的事件的反应, 在某种程度上, highlighted the very same fundamental problems: industry hasn’t taken nuclear safety as seriously as it should, and the NRC has failed to strengthen its regulatory framework.
We believe the NRC should revisit its post-Fukushima recommendations by adopting the following measures:
- 修订规管架构. The NRC’s current structure works against public safety.
- 加快将乏燃料转移到干桶. 这 相对简单的测量方法 能帮助防止严重的辐射泄漏吗.
- 增加应急规划区域的规模. The current radius of 10 miles doesn’t reflect the actual range of dangerous radioactive fallout released during Fukushima.
- 加强核管理委员会对操作员指导方针的监督. Guidelines for reactor management during a core-melt accident are currently maintained voluntarily and aren’t subject to NRC enforcement.
- 验证FLEX策略. The NRC should stress test the FLEX program to clearly understand and address its limitations.